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I
INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) has been regulating the technology and work
practices of employers. This governmental function is relatively new and is
quite different from the usual governmental involvement in labor market
policies. Some government efforts, such as job training and unemployment
compensation, involve no direct impact on workplace operations, except that
which may be induced indirectly through the incentives these policies
generate. Even the minimum wage law does not directly lead to any
governmental intrusion into the nature of the work relationship.
In contrast, OSHA regulations specify what safety guards must be on
machines, the characteristics of a safe ladder, the permissible levels of
exposure to various hazardous substances, and situations where protective
equipment must be worn. Such policies are certain to generate resistance
from management and, to the extent that these regulations are not well
formulated, they will provoke widespread controversy. Indeed, OSHA
policies have done just this. Although some controversy was inevitable,
OSHA has been the object of particularly harsh criticism because of the
ineptness of much of its original standards design and the ineffectiveness of
its enforcement policies.
The enforcement policies, however, have undergone substantial alteration
since the agency's creation. The original standards have been modified and
new standards have been added. In particular, each of the last two
presidential administrations has attempted to overhaul the enforcement
policy through fundamental changes in the enforcement strategy.
This article will explore how these policies have evolved as well as whether
these changes are desirable. Section II focuses on issues of standards design,
and sections III and IV focus on the efficacy of the enforcement process. The
fundamental issue discussed in those sections is whether or not OSHA is now
more effective in promoting safety than it was at the time of its creation.
Section V provides an overall assessment on OSHA's performance and
suggestions for further reforms in the agency's operations.
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II
THE STRUCTURE OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS
A. The Evolution of OSHA Policy
The general approach OSHA has taken to regulating job safety is dictated
at least in part by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.' The Act
authorizes OSHA to set standards that will "assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions."2 OSHA's enabling legislation, however, did not specify what
these standards should be, what general character they should take, or how
stringent they should be. As is indicated below, one might characterize
OSHA's general approach as adopting technology-based standards whose
stringency is limited only by their affordability. The strategy advocated in this
article and by many critics of OSHA is that the agency should pursue a more
performance-oriented approach that recognizes the necessity of taking into
account both the costs and risk reduction benefits in a comprehensive
manner.
3
Much of the policy-oriented debate over the safety standards has
concerned their stringency. Those critics advocating a more balanced
approach note that the Occupational Safety and Health Act does not require a
risk-free workplace; it requires only that safety be promoted "as far as
possible." 4 This and other qualifiers in the Act suggest that OSHA might
have some leeway in taking costs into consideration. This view was bolstered
somewhat by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Union Department,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,5 in which it overturned the safety
standard set by OSHA because OSHA had not shown that the reduction in
risks would be "significant." This significant risk criterion imposed a
threshold benefit level, but did not impose a requirement that OSHA balance
benefits and costs.
Indeed, such benefit-cost tests were explicitly ruled out in the 1981 U.S.
Supreme Court decision regarding the OSHA cotton dust standard,6 where
the court upheld the standard and interpreted the feasibility provisions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act as requiring only what is "capable of
being done."' 7 It is the technical possibility of compliance rather than benefit-
cost tradeoffs that should guide OSHA decisions. In fact, in this instance
OSHA had based its standards on cost-effectiveness concerns, not simply
affordability. More specifically, the standard is varied across different stages
of processing because of differences in the severity of the risk in these areas
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982).
3. See, e.g., W. Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE 128-32 (1983); Nichols & Zeckhauser, OSHA After a
Decade: A Time for Reason, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 202 (1981).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982).
5. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
6. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
7. Id. at 508-09.
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and differences in the cost of reducing the risk. 8 Further reductions in the risk
were clearly "capable of being done," and in fact, many employers have
already achieved cotton dust levels well below those specified in the
standard.9
Clearly, technological feasibility cannot be divorced from cost
considerations since almost any risk can be reduced for sufficiently large costs.
Drivers, for example, would face a lower risk of injury in an auto accident if
everyone drove full-sized cars, at speeds under thirty-five miles per hour.
Such measures have not been undertaken because the safety benefits do not
justify the loss in travel time and fuel efficiency. Similarly, OSHA varied the
cotton dust standard because the severity of cotton dust exposures differs
according to the stage of processing (since different types of fibers and dust
are airborne at different stages) and because compliance costs differ. 10
Indeed, under the Reagan Administration, OSHA now routinely calculates
the costs and benefits of its proposed regulations. 1 The agency, however,
does not explicitly compare the costs and benefits when discussing the
reasons for its policy recommendations. Inevitably, such a comparison is
made by OSHA, the Office of Management and Budget, or other players in
the regulatory process. Ideally, either the Supreme Court should reverse its
narrow and unrealistic interpretation of OSHA's mandate or Congress should
amend the Act to explicitly require balancing of costs and benefits.
Such a change would permit these important policy trade-offs to be
publicly considered within the context of the rulemaking process. In addition,
a stronger mandate regarding the importance of balanced policies no doubt
would lead to programs that reflect more accurately their relative costs and
benefits. Under the present system, which places an undue emphasis on the
level of risk reduction, regulations may impose costs that appear to be well
out of line with any reasonable values. An example is the OSHA arsenic
standard which has an estimated cost of almost $70 million per expected life
saved. 12
Because OSHA has adopted a narrow technology-based approach to safety
regulation, its regulatory structure also has been overly restrictive. Ideally,
OSHA should permit employers to achieve any given level of safety in the
least expensive manner consistent with well-defined and enforceable
regulations. Instead, OSHA has typically adopted uniform standards that
attempt to prescribe the design of the workplace.
8. See W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 124-26.
9. See CENTAUR Assoc., TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATING OCCUPATIONAL
EXPOSURE TO COTrON DUST at 1-4 (1983) (report prepared for the OSHA).
10. See id. at 3-1 to 4-42.
11. See, for example, the analysis of the proposed rulemaking for grain handling facilities, 49
Fed. Reg. 996, 1004-07 (1984).
12. W. ViscusI, supra note 3, at 124.
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This orientation derives in part from the pattern set in OSHA's initial
standard-setting activity.' 3 Shortly after beginning operations, OSHA issued
over 4,000 general industry standards for health and safety, most of which
were safety-related. These standards, which continue to comprise most of
OSHA's safety policies, were derived from the national consensus standards
of the American National Standards Institute, the National Fire Protection
Association, and some existing federal standards for maritime safety.' 4 In
issuing its standards, OSHA converted these discretionary guidelines into
mandatory prescriptions for workplace design.
The upshot of this effort was to establish OSHA as an object of ridicule for
its seemingly trivial standards, such as requiring portable toilets for
cowboys.' 5 Perhaps more significant than these well-publicized OSHA horror
stories was the overly specific character of the regulations in general. The
OSHA handrail regulation, for example, specifies a required height (thirty to
thirty-four inches), spacing of supporting brackets (not to exceed eight feet),
thickness (at least two inches for hardwood and one and a half inches for
metal pipe), and clearance with respect to the wall or any other object
(minimum of three inches). 16 Similarly, in its requirements for band guards
for abrasive wheels OSHA specifies the guards' required thickness, the
minimum diameter of rivets, and the maximum distance between the centers
of rivets.' 7
In each case, the specification standard approach may have imposed
greater costs than equally effective alternatives. To provide guidelines for
achieving flexibility in standards, President Ford's Task Force on OSHA
designed a model standard for machinery and machine guarding that
indicated, for example, several alternative ways to guard a punchpress.' 8 The
model standard has not yet been adopted, but it is an example of how OSHA
could achieve greater flexibility in its regulatory approach. The present
OSHA specification standards are so narrowly defined that they pertain to
only fifteen percent of all machines. 19
B. Efforts to Reform OSHA Standards
The primary emphasis during the Carter Administration was not on a
general restructuring of the standards approach, but on eliminating those
portions of the standards that were most extraneous and ill-conceived. The
13. For a more detailed discussion of the development of OSHA, see generally L. BACOW,
BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH (1980); J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY: AN ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY (1979); R. SMITH, THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS (1976); W. VISCUSI, supra
note 3; Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 3.
14. W. VIsCUSi, supra note 3, at 10.
15. See id. at 11.
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(e)(5)-(6) (1984).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.215, at 479 (1984).
18. OSHA SAFETY REGULATION: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 21-26 ( P. MacAvoy
ed. 1977).
19. Id. at preface.
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Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, Eula
Bingham, eliminated or modified 928 OSHA regulations in October 1978.20
In many cases these changes were only editorial and had no major substantive
impact. Nevertheless, the net effect of the elimination of the "nitpicking"
features from OSHA regulations was to reduce some of the harsher criticisms
of the agency's regulatory approach.
Perhaps because of the uncertainty created by the judicial battles over the
benzene and cotton dust standards, there was little other regulatory activity in
the safety area during the Carter Administration. A principal regulatory
initiative was the OSHA chemical labeling regulation, which was proposed at
the end of the Carter Administration and was subsequently revised by the
Reagan Administration. 2' This regulation represents an effort to utilize
market forces to promote safety by encouraging employers to provide workers
with risk information and to train them in the handling of chemicals. Much of
the impetus for this regulation came from the inability of direct regulatory
controls to address the entire range of chemical hazards. Although the
regulation's principal impact is on long-term health effects, acute health
effects (for example, skin rashes from chemical exposures) and accidents from
fires and explosions are also affected.
In addition to providing an innovative approach to regulation, the
chemical labeling standard is also a strongly performance-oriented regulation.
Employers are permitted to design their own labeling system because
different formats may be appropriate in different contexts. This flexibility,
for example, permits the paint and coating industry to retain the labeling
system that has been adopted on an industry-wide basis. The standard's
opportunity for discretion contrasts with the approach OSHA took in its
standard for radiation hazard warnings, which specify the sign's shape, the
background color, the words and location of the warning, and the size and
color of all letters. 22
The chief new safety standard proposed by the Reagan Administration is a
set of extensive rules intended to decrease the risks associated with grain
handling.23 These hazards are often well publicized since explosions in grain
handling facilities may lead to the deaths of dozens of workers. 24 Perhaps in
part because of the publicity and the safety incentives created by the market
and workers' compensation, there were no deaths from such explosions in
1983.25
20. These changes are discussed in the unpublished briefing notes prepared for OSHA officials.
See W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 11 & n.10.
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1985).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.96(f) (1984).
23. Grain Handling Facilities, 49 Fed. Reg. 996 (1984) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R., § 1910,
1917) (proposedJan. 6, 1984).
24. This notoriety is reflected in the academic literature as well. See the opening paragraph of
L. BAcow, supra note 13, at 3.
25. Office of Management and Budget, OSHA's Proposed Standards for Grain Handling
Facilities 17 & n.12 (1984) (unpublished memorandum). Because of the random nature of major
explosions, however, one should not conclude that the risk has been eliminated.
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The 1984 OSHA proposal is intended to reduce the risk further by
decreasing the dust levels in grain elevators, which in turn will reduce the risk
of explosions. What is noteworthy about this standard, which was the
outcome of substantial collaboration between OSHA and the Office of
Management and Budget, is that employers are given several alternatives to
decrease the dust level:
(i) to clean up the dust whenever it exceeds one-eighth of an inch;
(ii) to clean up the dust at least once per shift; or
(iii) to use pneumatic dust control equipment. 26
This flexibility provides an opportunity for employers to select the most cost-
effective option and will lead to lower compliance costs than would a uniform
specification standard.
Although the standard is innovative in its structure, the scope of the
standard is not ideal. By including all grain elevators, this proposed
regulation would also apply to the segment of the industry with low
throughput ratios. 2 7 Such facilities are primarily used for grain storage
operations rather than for grain handling, and the associated risks are
consequently quite different. Notwithstanding this limitation, OSHA's effort
to utilize the advantage of a performance-oriented approach represents a
significant, constructive contribution to OSHA policy development.
Other recent safety initiatives have consisted primarily of modifications of
existing regulations: oil and gas well drilling standards, 28 electrical standards
for construction, 2 9 powered platform standards, 30  crane and derrick
regulations, 3 1 and tunnel and shaft construction requirements. 3 2
While these proposals did not break new ground in terms of their
regulatory approach, in a few instances they raised noteworthy issues. In the
case of oil and gas well drilling, OSHA was revising the earlier standards
because the specification standard approach may have had a deleterious effect
on safety: "It was apparent that the general industry standards either did not
address or inadequately addressed a number of hazards unique to the oil and
gas well drilling and servicing industry, possibly even contributing to this
higher injury and illness incidence rate." 33
Because of their narrow orientation, specification standards may have a
potentially adverse effect on safety. The proposed standards, however, would
consist primarily of a series of technical requirements. This engineering
control emphasis is somewhat surprising in view of OSHA's own retrospective
26. Id. at 5-6.
27. Id. at 2-3. As pointed out in this report, the OSHA analysis is also highly deficient in a
variety of technical aspects.
28. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,202 (1983) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910) (proposed Dec. 28, 1983).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.800(1) (1985).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.66-.70 (1985).
31. 49 Fed. Reg. 6280 (1984) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1926) (proposed Feb. 17, 1984).
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.800(1) (1985).
33. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,202 (1983).
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assessment of the causes of oil and gas well drilling fatalities.3 4 OSHA's
report attributed only one-sixth of all deaths to the equipment and facilities,
whereas over half were due to workers' poor operating procedures.3 5 To
address the primary source of the safety problem, the OSHA standards should
emphasize training and education of workers rather than engineering
requirements.
The revised electrical standards for construction raised a similar
specification standard issue. This revision was directed primarily at
incorporating the latest changes in the National Electrical Code (many of
which were made in 1981) into the OSHA standard.3 6 The lag between the
state-of-the-art approach and the OSHA standard highlights the possibly
discouraging effect that design standards may have on innovative approaches
to safety. A performance standard orientation would have encouraged firms
to adopt new safety techniques that may be far more effective and less costly
than those detailed in the periodic revisions of OSHA guidelines.
Overall, there has not been a dramatic change in the structure of OSHA
safety standards since OSHA's initial standard-setting efforts. Some of the
extraneous and more frivolous standards have been pruned, other standards
have been updated to take into account technological changes, and a few new
standards have been added. There is likely to be little further reform in
standards already promulgated because there is not a strong constituency for
such changes. To the extent that more employers comply with the revisions
of the OSHA standards, any impetus for relaxation or modification of existing
regulations will be diminished.
Some progress may be made with respect to future standards, both in
recognizing the costs of the regulations and in introducting innovative
approaches to regulation. Recent OSHA efforts, such as the chemical labeling
and grain handling standards, represent significant advances in OSHA's
regulatory approach. More policies of this type should be encouraged.
Overall, however, the level of activity in the safety standard area has not been
great over the past decade, as OSHA has done little to alter its original focus.
III
AN OVERVIEW OF OSHA's ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
In order to design and enforce its standards, OSHA has assembled one of
the largest staffs of any risk regulation agency. OSHA now has over 2,300
employees, second only to the Environmental Protection Agency among
social regulation agencies.3 7 The total represents a drop of more than twenty
34. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL
FATALITIES RELATED TO OIL/GAS WELL DRILLING RIGS AS FOUND IN REPORTS OF OSHA
FATALITY/CATASTROPHE INVESTIGATIONS (1980).
35. See W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 26-27.
36. 48 Fed. Reg. 45,872, 45,875-878 (1983).
37. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., History of Appropriations and Positions (1984)
(unpublished memorandum on file with author).
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percent from the peak employment under President Carter,38 as a result of
the Reagan Administration's budget cuts. The staff, in conjunction with the
inspectors from states that choose to enforce OSHA regulations with state
inspectors, go to the workplace, ascertain whether there are violations, and
impose penalties for the violations. The inspectors may return for follow-up
inspections, and may assess additional penalties until compliance is ensured.
While this enforcement strategy has always been the OSHA approach,
there are other possible enforcement techniques. For example, OSHA might
impose penalties for safety violations to create incentives for compliance with
its standards, but not require compliance if the employer chooses to incur a
fine rather than make the investments needed to meet the standards.3 9 The
employer, in effect, would decide independently if the costs of meeting the
standard exceed the safety benefits. An alternative safety incentive
mechanism is to impose an injury tax which would have a safety-enhancing
impact without requiring the use of inspectors.40 This policy has the
additional advantage of creating financial incentives for safety that are more
strongly correlated with accident-generating activities than are specific
workplace characteristics.
It is important to recognize that there are alternative approaches to
generating safety incentives if the current enforcement strategy is ineffective.
As is indicated below, the current OSHA enforcement effort cannot be judged
a success; therefore, in examining its merits it is necessary to consider not
only possible incremental changes but also more sweeping overhauls.
Employers will choose to comply with OSHA standards if OSHA
establishes effective financial incentives for doing so. The employer,
consequently, must find it more attractive financially to make the safety
improvements than to risk an adverse OSHA inspection. The penalties that
result include fines levied by OSHA as well as any possible adverse effect on
the employer's reputation, which may in turn affect worker turnover or wages.
To assess whether these safety incentives are strong, each link in the OSHA
enforcement process will be examined.
A. Determinants of Safety Inspections
Before OSHA will have an effect on an employer, it either must inspect the
employer or create an effective threat of possible enforcement. OSHA
undertakes four types of inspections in this order of priority: (1) inspections
of imminent dangers, (2) investigations of fatalities and catastrophies, (3)
investigations of worker complaints and referrals, and (4) programmed
inspections. 41 This priority ranking has remained virtually unchanged over
38. Id.
39. This is similar to the approach advocated in W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 114-17, except that
firms would self-assess penalties in the framework suggested there.
40. The principal advocate of this approach is Robert Smith. See R. SMITH, supra note 13, at 78-
83.
41. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA
REVISED FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL at 11-3 (1984).
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the past decade, with the only modification being that the fourth category,
programmed inspections, includes what were formerly the fourth and fifth
categories-special programs and random general inspections. 42
The frequency of these types of inspections is inversely related to their
priority ranking.43 Roughly eighty-six percent of all inspections are general
programmed inspections, with complaint inspections comprising another nine
percent. 44 Somewhat surprisingly, complaint inspections produce few
violations per inspection, which suggests that disgruntled workers may be
using the OSHA inspection threat as a means of harassing the employer. 45
This pattern is unfortunate because of the potentially instrumental role of
workers and unions in promoting safety. The third most frequent inspection
category-follow-up inspections-also generates few violations, which may be
a sign of the efficacy of OSHA's enforcement efforts. 46 Even though follow-
up inspections generate few violations, the threat of a follow-up inspection
may nevertheless be important.
The summary of the enforcement effort in table 1 highlights the three
different eras of OSHA enforcement. The Nixon and Ford Administrations
established the general inspection approach. There was little change in
emphasis during this period except for a gradual expansion in the
enforcement effort. The Carter Administration attempted to eliminate some
of the less productive aspects of the enforcement policy. The number of
inspections and less important violations declined, but the penalties for
violations increased. The Reagan Administration marked the start of a less
confrontational approach and a more conscious targeting of inspections. The
biggest change was that the magnitude of penalties assessed for OSHA
violations plummeted.
The specific components of table 1 reflect these shifts in emphasis. The
total number of inspections rose steadily through fiscal year 1976, after which
it dropped by one-third as a result of the Carter Administration's attempt to
reduce the less productive inspections. The present level of inspections, less
than 70,000 annually, may seem substantial but it covers very few workplaces.
At this rate of inspection a particular enterprise could expect to be be
inspected less than once every two centuries.
Since many employers are small businesses with few employees, a more
suggestive index of coverage is the inspection rate per worker. As the fourth
line of table 1 indicates, almost three million employees were covered by
OSHA inspections. This figure represents the number of workers at sites
42. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH 3-4 (1973).
43. The numbers cited are based on OSHA, Federal Compliance Activity Report, Reporting
Period Oct. 1982 to Sept. 1983 (Feb. 7, 1984) (unpublished report).
44. Id.
45. See generally ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS, ABATEMENT OF VIOLATIONS, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF OSHA
SAFETY INSPECTIONS 15 (1980) (Technical Analysis Paper No. 62).
46. See id. at 21.
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covered by inspections, not the number of workers whose particular job
conditions were analyzed. Yet even this generous estimate of OSHA coverage
does not suggest a large-scale inspection effort because the average site will
be inspected by OSHA only once every thirty-four years.
The mix of OSHA inspection activities has also undergone significant
modifications. Manufacturing inspections have traditionally comprised about
half of all inspections, but this relative emphasis has declined since the advent
of the Reagan Administration. The mix has shifted toward inspections of the
construction industry. Whereas manufacturing inspections outnumbered
construction industry inspections by over two to one at times during the
Carter Administration, 47 during the Reagan Administration there have been
more construction industry than manufacturing inspections.
This relative emphasis is to some extent misleading because of the manner
in which construction inspections are tallied. Suppose an OSHA inspector
examines a construction site where there are five contractors performing
work. This single inspection will count as five inspections for purposes of
OSHA records, whereas a manufacturing firm visit will count as a single
inspection. Although the statistics consequently overstate the number of
construction inspections, the importance of the inspections has nevertheless
increased. The change is attributable to Thorne Auchter, a former
construction firm president, who, as Reagan's OSHA director, emphasized
construction inspections.
The shift to the multiple-count construction industry inspections also
masks a very substantial decline in the number of employees covered by
inspections. During fiscal years 1981 to 1983 OSHA averaged only 2.6
million workers at worksites covered by OSHA inspections-a drop of over
forty percent from the level for the preceding four fiscal years. The number
of workers covered by recent inspections is also down because fifteen percent
of all inspections now involve only checks of the employer's safety records
without any entry into the workplace. The reasons for this policy shift will be
discussed below.
The drop in employee coverage may also reflect the failure of OSHA to
sufficiently target large employers. During the early period of OSHA
operations, OSHA was criticized for focusing on small employers where few
workers could be protected as a result of OSHA inspections. 48 The focus on
small employers changed somewhat as OSHA began to cite an equal number
of violations per hour of inspection time in small employers as in large
employers. 49 Since more workers are affected per violation in large
employers than small employers, however, the shift toward larger employers
was still not sufficient. Under the Reagan Administration, the small number
47. OSHA, Federal Compliance Activity Report, Reporting Period October 1976-September
1977 (Sept. 14, 1982) (unpublished report).
48. W. Oi, On Evaluating the Effectiveness of the OSHA Inspection Program (1975)
(unpublished manuscript).
49. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra
note 45, at 15.
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of employees covered by inspections suggests a continued failure to target
inspections by employer size in an ideal manner.
Two aspects of inspections that reflect desirable changes are the emphasis
on health rather than safety and the emphasis on serious violations. Health
violations merit relatively greater attention since there are greater
inadequacies in the treatment of these risks. Safety risks are often well known
to workers and generate compensating wage differentials, higher quit rates,
and larger workers' compensation premiums-all of which establish
incentives for employers to promote safety. 50 In contrast, health hazards are
less well understood and, because of difficulties in monitoring causality, are
not covered as effectively by workers' compensation.
The number of health inspections doubled under the Carter
Administration in part because the decline in overall inspections in fiscal year
1977 primarily represented a drop in safety inspections. 5' The pattern
through fiscal year 1981 shows a gradual rise in the absolute number of health
inspections. 52 This increase was reversed under the Reagan Administration,
not so much because of a conscious decision to abandon the health area, but
because of the shift toward construction inspections, which are primarily
safety-related and are subject to multiple counting. The real total inspection
effort has declined, and the health inspection level reflects this.
Ideally, inspections also should identify serious violations rather than less
consequential threats to worker safety. This emphasis on serious violations
escalated considerably under the Carter Administration, as almost one-third
of all inspections began to discover serious violations. The drop in the
frequency of serious violations under the Reagan Administration reflects the
downward shift in the real inspection effort.
B. Violations and Penalties
Upon entering the workplace, the OSHA inspector attempts to identify
violations of OSHA standards for which he will assess penalties. In
determining whether or not an employer is in compliance, an OSHA
inspector cannot consider costs of meeting standards, only technical
feasibility. More specifically, it is "the existence of general technical
knowledge" that guides the compliance judgment. 53
In fiscal year 1977, when OSHA eliminated less important inspections and
citations for trivial violations, there was a dramatic drop in the number of
OSHA violations. There has since been a gradual and steady decline in the
number of violations, with a slight acceleration in the downward shift under
the Reagan Administration in fiscal years 1981-1983. At present, the average
inspection discovers less than two violations of OSHA standards. A welcome
change has been the emphasis upon violations that pose serious threats to
50. See W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 42-45, 63, 67-69, 78-79.
51. Id. at 18.
52. Id.
53. 6 OSHA, INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL at 1-10 to I-I1 (1980).
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worker health which, as the data in table 1 suggest, now comprise over one-
third of all standards violations.
The ultimate determinant of the financial impact of an OSHA inspection is
the dollar amount of the penalties that are assessed for noncompliance.
Notwithstanding the widespread notoriety of the enforcement effort, these
penalty levels have been consistently inconsequential. Annual penalties have
always been below $26 million and are now down to $6 million. One change
in the penalty structure occurred in the reforms of fiscal year 1977 when, at
the insistence of Congress, OSHA eliminated penalties for employers with
fewer than ten nonserious violations. 54 The overall level of penalties,
however, increased under the Carter Administration to more than double its
earlier level.
Under President Reagan's Administration, OSHA has adopted a less
confrontational approach in which penalties are well below their earlier levels.
Some penalty levels remain unchanged; willful and repeated violations, for
example, continue to be assessed at amounts not to exceed $10,000 each. 55
Other penalties are now governed by complex formulas pertaining to the
severity of the associated violations. 56 A particularly noteworthy change is
that employers can obtain reductions of up to thirty percent in the assessed
penalties if they comply with the standards. 57 Finally, no employer can now
be assessed penalties in excess of $10,000 without the formal approval of the
OSHA director-a change that has led to an eighty percent reduction in the
penalties in excess of that amount.58
The resulting financial incentives for safety are inconsequential. Penalties
now average fifty-seven dollars per violation, and annual OSHA penalties
total just over $6 million. In contrast, higher worker wages generated by job
risks are $69 billion, and workers' compensation premiums are in excess of
$10 billion.59 OSHA enforcement efforts comprise an inconsequential
addition to policies intended to promote workplace safety.
The OSHA penalties are also dwarfed by the anticipated costs of
compliance. OSHA regulations proposed between 1975 and 1980 alone have
a price tag of $100 to $500 billion; the costs of compliance are well above the
possible threat of OSHA sanctions. For OSHA's regulations to be effective,
there should be a dramatic expansion in the enforcement effort. Instead,
OSHA enforcement has declined, and this has been accompanied by a
fundamental change in its character. Because of the reduction in penalties for
employers that remedy OSHA violations, there is little threat from a random
OSHA inspection. An employer need do little to promote safety; it can simply
54. This change was mandated by a rider to the fiscal year 1977 OSHA appropriations bill. Act
of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418, 1421.
55. AssisTANT SECRETARY FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra
note 41, at VI-15.
56. Id. at VI-1 to VI-21.
57. Id. at VI-11.
58. P. SIMON, REAGAN IN THE WORKPLACE: UNRAVELING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY NET 64 (1983).
59. W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 44.
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await the arrival of the OSHA inspector. The employer will avoid correcting
safety problems that the inspector may not identify, and it will face minimal
penalties if it makes the suggested changes. The elimination of the expected
losses from penalties suggests that OSHA will have little impact on the great
majority of employers that are not inspected since the possible deterrence
value of inspections has been sacrificed. Since the expected penalties were
quite low, however, this loss may not be significant.
IV
ENFORCEMENT TARGETING AND IMPACT
A. Efforts to Improve the Efficacy of OSHA Inspections
Perhaps the most controversial recent change in OSHA enforcement
policies was the introduction of records check inspections in October 1981.
In these programmed safety inspections, the OSHA inspector first examines
the employer's lost workday accident rate for the past two years (three years
for very small employers). 60 If this rate is below the most recently available
national manufacturing lost workday rate, the employer is not formally
inspected. For example, an employer inspected in 1984 would have its 1982
and 1983 lost workday accident rates available. These could be compared
with the 1982 manufacturing rate, since there is a two-year lag in publishing
the Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
The records check procedure has been criticized because OSHA counts
these as inspections even though the inspector never enters the workplace. 6 1
Such misrepresentations of the total inspection effort have generated criticism
that is in many respects justifiable since, along with the multiple counting of
construction industry inspections, the misrepresentations obscure the real
decline in the OSHA enforcement effort. As the data in table 2 suggest,
records check inspections constitute one-seventh of all OSHA inspections and
excluding these from the inspection total leads to a slight drop in inspections
under the Reagan Administration.
The shortcomings in OSHA's miscounting of the real inspection level does
not, however, imply that records check inspections are a bad idea. Ideally,
OSHA should target its efforts toward riskier employers. Inspecting an
employer with a poor safety record provides greater opportunities for safety
gains than does inspecting a very safe firm. One might expect that OSHA
would simply examine the injury reports submitted by the employer each year
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics and use this information to target the
inspections. In what appears to be a parochial dispute within the U.S.
Department of Labor, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has refused to give
OSHA access to the individual employer data on the grounds that doing so
would undermine the confidentiality of the data, possibly tainting their
60. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra
note 41, at 11-15, 111-26.
61. See P. SIMON, supra note 49, at 8 & n.6.
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quality. Since the Internal Revenue Service uses data submitted by taxpayers
to enforce tax policies, and federal wage and price control efforts have used
similar information to enforce these income policies, it would not be
unprecedented to use such risk data for purposes of enforcement. The
present practice of, in effect, gathering the data manually under the guise of a
records check represents a highly inefficient means of acquiring pivotal
information regarding accident rates.
Once the risk information has been acquired, the data should be used to
target OSHA inspections. The present procedure, however, is an overly
simplistic approach to doing so. Ideally, risky employers should be identified
relative to what is achievable within a particular industry; this will be based on
the industry's costs of compliance. OSHA's procedure of targeting firms on
the basis of whether their record is better than the national manufacturing
average fails to incorporate this heterogeneity in the costs of promoting
safety.
Table 3 includes representative ratios of the average lost workday record
compared to the overall manufacturing lost workday rate. A worker may be at
a chemical firm or a petroleum product company that is almost twice as
hazardous as the industry average, yet it will be exempt from inspection. A
worker in a comparatively safe sawmill or fabricated metal factory will be at a
workplace that will be a prime candidate for OSHA inspection. Most
employers will fall in such extreme groups since there are very few industries
whose accident records are within ten percent of the manufacturing average.
The present procedure exempts too many "bad actors" from safe
industries and leads to the inspection of too many good performers in risky
industries. If the ultimate objective is to achieve the greatest risk reduction,
one should take into account performance relative to the industry since that
will be an index of the potential gains that can be achieved from
improvements in the workplace technology.
Standard criticisms of the use of records check inspections appear to have
been misplaced. Records checks are a useful and potentially valuable tool.
The deficiency lies instead in the targeting procedure. Because of the
introduction of records check inspections and the increased emphasis on
construction inspections, the overall inspection total provides a misleading
index of inspection activity. A more instructive measure is the total number of
inspection hours. As indicated by the data in table 2, there has been a
substantial drop of about one-third in inspector effort between fiscal year
1980 and fiscal year 1983. Somewhat surprisingly, the drop is greater for
health inspections. The decline in health inspections should be unaffected by
the rise of records check inspections, which pertain only to safety inspections,
and instead seems due to the increased emphasis on construction.
The case hours devoted per inspection also declined under the Reagan
Administration after having increased under the Carter Administration.
Health inspections traditionally are more time-consuming because of the
nature of the tests that must be performed. The reduction in time devoted to
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TABLE 3
RATIO OF 1981-1982 AVERAGE LOST WORKDAY RATE TO 1981
MANUFACTURING LOST WORKDAY RATE
Finance, insurance, and real estate .38
Apparel and other textiles .42
Services .45
Instruments and related products .49
Chemicals and allied products .52
Petroleum and coal products .52
Electric and electronic equipment .53
Printing and publishing .59
Textile mill products .59
Wholesale and retail trade .61
Tobacco manufacturing .70
Miscellaneous manufacturing .83
Transportation equipment .84
Machinery, except electrical .91
Leather and leather products .94
Paper and allied products 1.01
Furniture and fixtures 1.15
Primary metal industries 1.19
Construction 1.21
Stone, clay, and glass products 1.27
Rubber and miscellaneous 1.29
Fabricated metal products 1.36
Food and kindred products 1.63
Lumber and wood products 1.70
Source: Calculations by the author using Bureau of Labor Statistics lost workday
rate data.
safety inspections is due in large part to the rise of records check inspections,
but the drop in hours per health inspection suggests an overall reduction in
effort per inspection.
The citations issued during each inspection provide a more meaningful
measure of the productivity of inspections than does case hour time, which is
an input measure. In the case of both safety and health inspections, the
citation rate has risen to levels that are only exceeded by the early OSHA
years when trivial violations were often cited. The recent increase reflects the
beneficial effect of better targeting of inspection resources. Indeed, once
records check inspections are excluded from the safety inspection total, the
citation rate for safety inspections would be almost twenty percent greater
than the thirty percent citation rate increase between fiscal years 1980 and
1983. Improved inspection targeting may consequently have led to as much
as a fifty percent increase in the citation rate per inspection.
A fundamental shift in the approach taken in OSHA inspections was the
effort to reduce the confrontational character displayed in OSHA policies. 62
Rather than the policeman of the workplace, OSHA assumed the role of a
62. For a detailed discussion and critique of the new approach, see P. SIMON, supra note 49, at
44-69.
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consultant on workplace issues. This shift is reflected in the substantial drop
in OSHA penalties. A related change was the drop in inspection outcomes
contested by employers. The decline from a twenty-one percent contested
rate to a three percent rate-which is the lowest rate in OSHA history-was
the outcome of a policy decision to attempt to settle disagreements with
employers in order to reduce the number of contested cases. Whether the
nonconfrontational OSHA will be more effective is unclear.
The changing character of the OSHA enforcement effort also is
exemplified by the change in the mix of violations cited by OSHA inspectors.
Although the OSHA standards have not changed dramatically over the past
decade, the role of different violation categories has undergone many
significant modifications. In the initial years of OSHA operations, violations
for walking and working surfaces (such as misplaced exit signs) constituted
about one-fifth of all violations, as indicated in table 4. Many of these
violations were for less important risks, some of which were readily visible to
workers as well. The drop of roughly fifty percent in this category suggests
that OSHA's resources have been redirected to more profitable areas.
Somewhat surprisingly, the other chief violations category-machinery
and machine guarding-has exhibited an increase in violations, so that now
over one-third of all violations are in this group. Since these standards have
been enforced by OSHA for over a decade, the continued high violations rate
appears to reflect a lack of compliance with OSHA standards. In contrast,
there has been a dramatic improvement in electrical hazard violations.
The two categories of violations displaying the most important increases
are health-realted. The number of health and environmental control
violations (for example, noise, ventilation, and radiation) has risen to eight
percent, and violations for toxic and hazardous substances (such as asbestos
and coke oven emissions) now comprise a similar percentage. Although some
of these increases are the result of an increase in the number of health
standards, there has been a noteworthy upward shift in the number of health
violations. OSHA enforcement policies remain primarily safety-related, but
health hazards no longer constitute a trivial portion of the enforcement effort.
B. An Assessment of the Impact of OSHA Enforcement
Employers will choose to make the necessary investments in health and
safety if the OSHA enforcement policy makes it in the employer's financial
self-interest to do so. As the discussion above indicates, the three links in
establishing these incentives-inspections, violations, and penalties-are all
relatively weak. An employer has less than one chance in two hundred of
being inspected in any given year. If inspected, the average employer will be
found guilty of less than two violations of the standards, and for each violation
the average penalty will be under sixty dollars. Overall, the violation cost per
worker is only fifty-seven cents. In contrast, market forces, through
compensating differentials in combination with workers' compensation
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premiums, impose costs in excess of $800 per worker.63 Quite simply,
OSHA's enforcement effort is too modest to create truly effective financial
incentives for safety.
Even if these incentives were strong, not all risks could be eliminated
because many accidents stem from aspects of the work process other than the
specific technological characteristics regulated by OSHA. Chief among these
contributors are worker actions. The estimates of the role of the worker in
causing accidents vary in part because of the difficulty in attributing
responsibility for accidents caused jointly by worker actions and technological
deficiencies. It is clear, however, that worker actions play a substantial role.
OSHA found that over half of all fatal accidents on oil and gas well drilling
rigs were due to poor operating procedures. 64 Worker actions also have been
found to be a major contributor to sixty-three percent of the National Safety
Council's accident measure, 65 ninety-five percent of Pennsylvania workers'
compensation cases, 66 forty-five percent of Wisconsin workers' compensation
cases, 67 and the majority of accidents among deep sea divers in the North
Sea.68
Recent studies reinforce the view that at best OSHA regulations could
have a significant but not dramatic effect on workplace safety. One recent
statistical analysis estimated that if there were full compliance with OSHA
standards, workplace accidents would drop by just under ten percent. 69 A
recent detailed analysis of workplace accidents in California had somewhat
more optimistic conclusions. At most, fifty percent of all fatal accidents were
contributed to by violations of OSHA standards that potentially could have
been detected by an OSHA inspector visiting the day before the accident.70
Because of these limitations and the weakness of the OSHA enforcement
effort, it is not surprising that a substantial impact of OSHA on workplace
safety is not readily apparent. Table 5 summarizes the injury rate trends for
the 1972-1981 period for both the manufacturing industry and the entire
private sector. The two risk measures are the overall workplace injury rate
and the rate for cases that involved at least one lost workday. During the
initial years of OSHA operations, employers tended to over-report injuries
because they had to adapt to a new reporting system. Nevertheless, the
63. This estimate was based on the risk premium estimates in W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 44,
and the number of workers employed, and was taken from the BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982-1983, at 376 (1982).
64. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 34.
65. NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 287-88 (1973).
66. Id.
67. See ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
supra note 45, at 16.
68. See U.S. COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED OSHA DEEP
SEA DIVERS STANDARD (1977).
69. A. Bartel & L. Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's
Impact 23 (1983) (unpublished manuscript).
70. Mendeloff, The Role of OSHA Violations in Serious Workplace Accidents, 26J. OccuP. MED. 353,
356 (1984).
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overall trend is clearly downward in the case of overall injuries. Such a
decline is not unexpected since worker accident rates have been declining by
about two percent annually over the past half century.
7
'
TABLE 5
INJURY RATE TRENDS, 1972-1981
All Manufacturing All Private Sector
Overall Injury Lost Workday Overall Injury Lost Workday
Rate Injury Rate Rate Rate
(Incidence Rates per 100 (Incidence Rates per 100
Full Time Workers) Full Time Workers)
Year
1972 15.6' 4.2' 10.91 3.3
1973 15.3 4.5 11.0 3.4
1974 14.6 4.7 10.4 3.5
1975 13.0 4.5 9.1 3.3
1976 13.2 4.8 9.2 3.5
1977 13.1 5.1 9.3 3.8
1978 13.2 5.6 9.4 4.1
1979 13.3 5.9 9.5 4.3
1980 12.2 5.4 8.7 4.0
1981 11.5 5.1 8.32 3.8
1982 10.2 4.4 7.72 3.5
1983 9.7 4.2 7.5 3.4
Data for 1972-1981 from BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS, BULLETIN 2175 (1983). Data for 1982 from U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Injuries
and Illnesses 1982, microfiche 83-471 (released Nov. 4, 1983). Data for 1983 are from a press re-
lease of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, on November 14, 1984.
'Data for agricultural production, all of mining except oil and gas extraction, and railroads were
not included in 1972 estimates.
2Excludes firms with fewer than 1 I employees.
The pattern exhibited by lost workday accident rates is more uneven.
These more serious accidents increased throughout the 1970's, but they have
since declined. Although some observers have pointed to the recent declines
as evidence of OSHA's effectiveness, much of the decline is no doubt due to
cyclical factors. The years 1981 and 1982 were periods of escalating
unemployment, as total civilian unemployment rates climbed to 7.5% and
then to 9.5%.72 Since workplace accidents are less frequent during cyclical
downturns, the recent declines do not stem primarily from the change in
OSHA policy but are primarily the result of shifts in macroeconomic policy.
Econometric studies of OSHA's performance through the mid-1970's have
failed to identify any substantial impact of the OSHA enforcement effort. 73
An update of these analyses through the 1982 period 74 indicates, somewhat
71. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 3, at 30.
72. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIc ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 255 (1984).
73. W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 6-36.
74. These exploratory results are reported in W. Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety
and Health Regulation, 1973-1982 (1985) (unpublished manuscript).
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surprisingly, that there is a statistically significant impact of OSHA
enforcement on workplace safety even after taking into account cyclical
factors and industry-specific conditions.
The most effective OSHA enforcement tool appears to be the rate of
inspections. It is the inspection coverage rather than the penalty level that is
most influential: the impact of OSHA inspections on workplace safety has an
effect on worker injury rates that increases with the severity of the injury.
Although the absolute magnitude of the impact of OSHA is not large, when
viewed in percentage terms the effects appear to be more substantial. More
specifically, OSHA enforcement efforts have reduced the overall injury and
illness rate by two to three percent and the rate of injuries involving a lost
workday by three to four percent. 75
These exploratory results for manufacturing industries may be refined
after analysis of the 1983 experience is completed, but they suggest that
OSHA enforcement efforts are finally beginning to have a beneficial impact on
workplace safety. An improvement over the early OSHA experience should
be expected, as the standards have been refined and there is more systematic
targeting of the inspection effort. The overall impact continues to be
relatively modest, however, as job risks continue to be largely dictated by
forces other than government regulation.
V
TOWARD SOUND OSHA POLICIES
In some fundamental respects, OSHA safety policies have not changed
their general character. Most of the safety regulations were originally issued
in the first year of the agency's existence. The enforcement policy remains a
fairly weak effort whose essential character of workplace inspections and
penalties for standards violations has remained unaltered.
Nevertheless, there have been some significant changes, some of which are
beneficial. In terms of the structure of the safety standards, there was a
substantial improvement under the Carter Administration through the
elimination of many of the more extraneous features of the standards. The
major achievements under the Reagan Administration have been the
proposed grain handling facility standard, which would incorporate a
desirable performance-oriented feature, and the OSHA chemical labeling
standard, which would utilize risk information rather than technological
controls to promote safety.
Notwithstanding these beneficial additions and the pruning of OSHA
regulations, the bulk of the regulations that remain in force are the same as
those that have been in place since the advent of OSHA operations. There
has been no systematic review of these standards to ensure that the safety
benefits are significant in comparison with the costs they impose. Even if
OSHA does not adopt a cost-benefit criterion and focuses instead on some
75. W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 28.
[Vol. 49: No. 4
Page 127: Autumn 1986]
other index of a policy's efficacy, it would be useful to review standards
periodically to assess whether they are pertinent.
The outdated features of the electrical standards and the oil and gas well
drilling standards that led to their revision may have parallels in other
standards as well. Some needed changes will be highlighted by private
actions, such as changes in the National Electrical Code. To ensure that
similar revisions are undertaken where necessary, OSHA should establish a
formal process to review the standards in place and to encourage sunset
actions for outmoded standards.
The flexibility offered by the OSHA grain handling standard could serve as
a performance-oriented model for other OSHA standards. Ideally, OSHA
should examine the set of existing standards to ascertain which standards can
be profitably modified to take a more performance-oriented approach. Some
revisions of this type could be the subject of future OSHA rulemaking activity.
In addition, the OSHA inspectors could attempt to take a more performance-
oriented approach by not citing those workplace violations that represent
alternative mechanisms for promoting safety. In recent years much emphasis
has been placed on the consultative function of OSHA. A beneficial use of
OSHA's consultative services would be to advise employers seeking the least
costly manner to promote safety.
For OSHA standards to have an impact, the enforcement effort must be
much more vigorous than it now is. Some rudimentary targeting efforts have
been undertaken, and these should be refined. Most importantly, the scale of
OSHA's enforcement policy should be increased. A substantial increase in
the number of inspectors and an increase in the penalty level would create
much stronger incentives for safety.
While OSHA's enforcement has always been weak, fewer penalties are now
being assessed because recent enforcement reductions have been almost
completely in terms of penalties. Such retrenchment may not greatly affect
the enforcement program's efficacy since the starting point was also very low.
It is OSHA inspections, rather than penalties, that appear to be most
instrumental in encouraging compliance. If the cost of individual penalties
were boosted by a factor of 100 or more, however, OSHA's penalties would
become a significant enforcement factor.
Although it is difficult to recommend more stringent enforcement in the
absence of any reform of the standards, if the safety standards were put on a
sounder basis, an expanded enforcement policy would be desirable. It should
be recognized, however, that not all employers may find it feasible to come
into compliance. Some changes in technology may be inordinately expensive.
In these instances, the objective of OSHA penalties should not be to compel
compliance but to provide efficient incentives for safety. In extreme cases of
costly compliance, it would be preferable to permit employers to pay the
OSHA ENFORCEMENT
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penalty rather than make substantial investments that offer few health
benefits.76
Even without such a fundamental shift in the character of the enforcement
policy, much can be done to improve the effectiveness of OSHA's efforts to
promote safety. Greater flexibility in standards design and more stringent
enforcement are chief among these possible reforms. OSHA has, and will
continue to have, a legitimate role to play in the promotion ofjob safety, but a
continuation of the present policies will not enable the agency to fulfill its
potential.
76. This policy proposal is detailed in W. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 160-61.
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